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All Bayesian epistemologists agree on two claims. The first, which we
might call Precise Credences, says that an agent’s doxastic state at a given
time t in her epistemic life can be represented by a single credence function
Pt, which assigns to each proposition A about which she has an opinion a
precise numerical value Pt(A) that is at least 0 and at most 1. Pt(A) is the
agent’s credence in A at t. It measures how strongly she believes A at t,
or how confident she is at t that A is true. The second point of agreement,
which is typically known as Probabilism, says that an agent’s credence func-
tion at a given time should be a probability function: that is, for all times
t, Pt(>) = 1 for any tautology >, Pt(⊥) = 0 for any contradiction ⊥, and
Pt(A ∨ B) = Pt(A) + Pt(B)− Pt(AB) for any propositions A and B.
So Precise Credences and Probabilism form the core of Bayesian epis-
temology. But, beyond these two norms, there is little agreement between
its adherents. Bayesian epistemologists disagree along (at least) two di-
mensions. First, they disagree about the correct norms concerning updat-
ing on evidence learned with certainty — some say there are diachronic
norms concerning how an agent should in fact update; others say there are
only synchronic norms concerning how an agent should plan to update;
and others think there are no norms concerning updating at all. Second,
they disagree about the stringency of the synchronic norms that don’t con-
cern updating. Our concern here is with the latter. Two candidates norms
of this sort: the Principal Principle, which says how an agent’s credences
in propositions concerning the objective chances should relate to her cre-
dences in other propositions (Lewis, 1980); and the Principle of Indiffer-
ence, which says, roughly, that an agent with no evidence should divide
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her credences equally over all possibilities (Keynes, 1921; Carnap, 1950;
Jaynes, 2003; Williamson, 2010; Pettigrew, 2014). Those we might call Rad-
ical Subjective Bayesians (or RSBs) adhere to Precise Credences and Proba-
bilism, but reject the Principal Principle and the Principle of Indifference.
Those we might call Moderate Subjective Bayesians (or MSBs) adhere to Pre-
cise Credences, Probabilism, and the Principal Principle, but they reject the
Principle of Indifference. And the Objective Bayesians (or OBs) accept all of
the principles. The following table summarises the situation:
RSB MSB OB
Precise Credences X X X
Probabilism X X X
Principal Principle × X X
Principle of Indifference × × X
In a recent paper, Hawthorne et al. (2015) (henceforth, HLWW) argue
that MSB is an unstable position, because the Principal Principle entails
the Principle of Indifference. Thus, it is inconsistent to accept the former
and reject the latter. We must either reject the Principal Principle, as the
RSB does, or accept it together with the Principle of Indifference, as the OB
does.
Notoriously, as Lewis originally stated it, the Principal Principle in-
cludes an admissibility condition (Lewis, 1980, 266-7). Equally notoriously,
Lewis did not provide a precise account of this condition, thereby leaving
his formulation of the principle similarly imprecise. HLWW do not give a
precise account either, but they do appeal to two principles concerning ad-
missibility, which they call Condition 1 and Condition 2 (Hawthorne et al.,
2015, 124). There are two ways of reading their argument, depending on
how you understand the status of Conditions 1 and 2. Reading 1: The
correct account of admissibility is determined independently of these two
principles, and yet these two principles follow from that correct account.
Reading 2: The correct account of admissibility is determined in part by
these two principles, so that the principles follow from that account but
only because the correct account is constrained so that it must satisfy them.
HLWW then show that, given an account of admissibility on which Con-
ditions 1 and 2 hold, the Principal Principle entails the Principle of Indif-
ference (Hawthorne et al., 2015, Proposition 2). I will argue that, on either
reading of the argument, it fails. I will argue in section 4 that there is a
plausible account of admissibility on which Conditions 1 and 2 are false.
That defeats the first reading of the argument. I will then argue in section 5
that the intuitions that lead us to assent to Condition 2 also lead us to assent
to other very closely related principles that are inconsistent with Condition
2. This, I claim, casts doubt on the reliability of those intuitions, and thus
removes our justification for Condition 2. This defeats the second reading
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of the HLWW argument. Thus, the argument fails. Moderate Subjective
Bayesianism is a coherent position.
1 Introducing the Principal Principle
We begin by introducing the Principal Principle.1 To aid our statement, let
me introduce a piece of notation. Given a proposition A, a time t, and a
real number 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, let CA,tx be the following proposition: The objective
chance of A at t is x. And we will let P0 be the credence function of our agent
at the very beginning of her epistemic life — when she is, as Lewis would
say, a superbaby; that is, she is not yet in receipt of any evidence. Then, as
HLWW formulate the Principal Principle, it says this:
HLWW’s Principal Principle Suppose A, E are propositions, t
is a time, and 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. Then it should be the case that
P0(A|CA,tx E) = x
providing (i) P0(CA,tx E) > 0, and (ii) E is admissible for A at t.
In this version, the principle applies to an agent only at the beginning of
her epistemic life; it governs her initial credence function. In this situation,
the principle says, her credence in a proposition A conditional on the con-
junction of some proposition E and a chance proposition that says that the
chance of A at t is x should be x, providing the conditional probability is
well-defined and E is admissible for A at time t.
The motivation for the admissibility condition is this. Suppose E entails
A. Then we surely don’t want to demand that P0(A|CA,tx E) = x. After all,
if x < 1, then such a demand would conflict with Probabilism, since it is
a consequence of Probabilism that, if E entails A, then P0(A|CA,tx E) = 1.
Thus, we must at least restrict the Principal Principle so that it does not
apply when E entails A. But there are other cases in which the Princi-
pal Principle should not be imposed, even if such an application would
not be outright inconsistent with other norms such as Probabilism. For in-
stance, suppose that E entails that the chance of A at some later time t′ > t
is x′ 6= x. Then, again, we don’t want to require that P0(A|CA,tx E) = x,
1Now, as Lewis himself noted, the Principal Principle has implausible consequences
when the chances are self-undermining — that is, when the chances assign a positive prob-
ability to outcomes in which the chances are different. This happens, for instance, for Lewis’
own favoured account of chance, the Humean account or Best System Analysis. This lead to
reformulations of the Principal Principle, such as Thau’s and Hall’s New Principle (Lewis,
1994; Thau, 1994; Hall, 1994) and Ismael’s General Recipe (Ismael, 2008). HLWW say noth-
ing explicitly about whether or not chances are self-undermining. But, since they are in-
terested in investigating the Principal Principle and not the New Principle or the General
Recipe, I take them to assume that chances are not self-undermining. I will do likewise.
3
because information about later chances trumps information about earlier
chances. The moral is this: if E contains information about A that trumps
or overrides the information provided by the proposition, CA,tx , which says
that the chance of A at t is x, then it is inadmissible for A at t. Clearly any
proposition that logically entails A provides such overriding information;
and so does a proposition that entails something about the chance of A at
a later time. So much for propositions that are inadmissible. Are there any
we can be sure are admissible for A at t? According to Lewis, there are,
namely, propositions solely concerning time t or earlier times t′ < t. Thus,
Lewis does not give a precise account of admissibility: he gives a heuristic
— E is admissible for A at t if E does not provide information about A that
overrides the information contained in propositions about the chance of A
at t — and he gives examples of propositions that do and do not provide
such information — I’ve recalled some of Lewis’ examples here.
2 Introducing the Principle of Indifference
The HLWW argument seeks to establish that the Principle of Indifference
follows from the Principal Principle. We have met the latter; now, let’s meet
the former. In fact, the version of the Principle of Indifference that HLWW
consider is rather weaker than the usual version of that norm. According to
the usual version, an agent with no evidence should divide her credences
equally across all possibilities. If I have credences in two atomic proposi-
tions, F and G, and all Boolean combinations of them, then the possibilities
in question are FG, FG, FG, and FG.2 Thus, according to the usual ver-
sion of the Principle of Indifference (together with Probabilism), if I have
no evidence whatsoever, I should assign credences as follows:
P0(FG) = P0(FG) = P0(FG) = P0(F G) =
1
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Instead, the version of the Principle of Indifference that appears in the
HLWW argument just says this:
HLWW’s Principle of Indifference Suppose F is an atomic
proposition. Then it should be the case that
P0(F) =
1
2
2According to HLWW, a proposition is atomic iff it is “not logically complex”
(Hawthorne et al., 2015, 124). They give the following examples: “Fido is exploding” and
“The sun will rise tomorrow”. Thus, atomic propositions that ascribe a predicate to a sub-
ject. They are the propositions that we would render as atomic formulae were we to create
a language for the world in first-order logic. As we will see below, the notion of an atomic
formulae plays an important role in HLWW’s argument. On the basis of this loose charac-
terization, we might wonder whether the notion can bear that weight — after all, it is not
clear that there is always a determinate fact of the matter whether a proposition is logically
complex or logically simple. I will not pursue this objection here.
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It is clear that this does not entail the usual version. In the case above, in
which I have credences in atomic propositions F and G and their Boolean
combinations, it demands that
P0(F) = P0(G) =
1
2
but nothing stronger. It imposes no constraints on my credences in FG and
FG other than that they should sum to 12 ; and it imposes no constraints on
my credences in FG and FG other than that they should sum to 12 . However,
it is nonetheless strong enough that the Radical Subjective Bayesian (RSB)
will deny it. They claim that credences even in atomic propositions are
unconstrained at the beginning of an agent’s epistemic life.
3 The HLWW argument
The HLWW argument turns on a mathematical theorem:
Theorem 1 ((Hawthorne et al., 2015)) Suppose P is a probability function. If
there is 0 < x < 1 such that
(i) P(A|XF) = x
(ii) P(A|X(A↔ F)) = x
(iii) P(F|X) = P(F)
then
(iv) P(F) = 12 .
How can we use this to establish HLWW’s Principle of Indifference on the
basis of Lewis’ Principal Principle? Well, notice first that (iv) is the condi-
tion imposed on atomic propositions by HLWW’s Principle of Indifference.
Thus, if, for any atomic proposition F, we can find A, X, and 0 < x < 1
such that (i), (ii), and (iii) hold, then we can establish HLWW’s Principle of
Indifference. This is where Lewis’ Principal Principle enters. Let F be an
atomic proposition. First, we find a time t and a proposition A (not neces-
sarily atomic) such that: (a) the truth value of A is not fixed by t; and (b)
our agent’s evidence gives no information about the connection between F
and A. Then pick any 0 < x < 1 and let X be the proposition CA,tx , which
says that the objective chance of A at t is x. Then, according to HLWW, (i),
(ii), and (iii) hold. First, they appeal to what they call Condition 1 (which I
paraphrase here):
Condition 1 If your evidence at t gives no information about
the connection between A and F, then F is admissible for A at t
(where F is an atomic proposition).
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Together with Lewis’ Principal Principle, this gives clause (i) — P(A|XF) =
P(A|CA,tx F) = x. Second, they appeal to what they call Condition 2 (again,
paraphrased here):
Condition 2 If your evidence at t gives no information about
the connection between A and F, then A ↔ F is admissible for
A at t (where F is an atomic proposition).
Together with Lewis’ Principal Principle, this gives clause (ii) — P(A|X(A↔
F)) = P(A|CA,tx (A ↔ F)) = x. Finally, they appeal to what I will call Con-
dition 3:
Condition 3 If your evidence at t gives no information about
the connection between A and F, then your credence function
should treat F and CA,tx as evidentially irrelevant to one another
(for any probability x); that is, your credence function should
render F and CA,tx probabilistically independent.
This gives (iii). Thus, together with Lewis’ Principal Principle, Conditions
1, 2, and 3 give clauses (i), (ii), and (iii). Thus, they give (iv). And so they
secure for us HLWW’s Principle of Indifference.
The upshot: in order to derive HLWW’s Principle of Indifference from
Lewis’ Principal Principle, we need three further ingredients: Conditions
1, 2, and 3. Conditions 1 and 2 concern admissibility. In the following two
sections we consider two readings of these conditions — on the first, they
are intended to be justified on the basis of the correct account of admissi-
bility (section 4); on the second, they are constraints on the correct account
of admissibility, and such an account is justified in part by showing that it
satisfies them (section 5).
4 Reading 1: Admissibility justifies Conditions 1 and
2
On this reading, we have an account of admissibility that we obtain inde-
pendently of considering Conditions 1 and 2, and that account of admissi-
bility entails those conditions. I will object to the argument read in this way
by presenting an account of admissibility, demonstrating its strengths, and
showing that Conditions 1 and 2 are false according to that account.
Above, we stated the Principal Principle as follows:
HLWW’s Principal Principle
P0(A|CA,tx E) = x,
providing (i) P0(CA,tx E) > 0, and (ii) E is admissible for A at t.
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Now suppose we make the following assumption about admissibility:
Contemporaneous Chance Admissibility Propositions that solely
concern the objective chances at t are admissible for any propo-
sition at t.
Thus, for instance, P0(A|CA,tx CB,ty ) = x, providing P0(CA,tx CB,ty ) > 0, which
also ensures that CA,tx and C
B,t
y are compatible.
Now suppose that, if ch is a probability function defined over all the
propositions about which the agent has an opinion, Ctch is the proposition
that says that the objective chances at t are given by ch.3 Then it follows
from HLWW’s Principal Principle and Contemporaneous Chance Admis-
sibility that P0(A|Ctch) = ch(A).4 But it also follows from this that:5
Levi’s Principal Principle (Bogdan, 1984; Hall, 2004; Pettigrew,
2012)
P0(A|CtchE) = ch(A|E),
providing P0(CtchE), ch(E) > 0.
This is a version of the Principal Principle that makes no mention of admis-
sibility. From it, something close to HLWW’s Principal Principle follows:
Let CA|E,tx be the following proposition: The objective chance of A conditional
on E at t is x. Then Levi’s Principal Principle entails that
P0(A|CA|E,tx E) = x
whenever P0(C
A|E,t
x E) > 0. Thus, instead of setting your conditional cre-
dence in A given that ch is the objective chance function to ch(A), you bring
ch up to speed with your evidence E, and set your credence to ch(A|E) in-
stead.
A striking feature of Levi’s Principal Principle is that it does not ap-
peal to the notion of admissibility at any point. It applies equally when
the proposition E is not admissible in Lewis’ sense. Nonetheless, it does
suggest a precise account of admissibility.
3This might seem a demanding assumption. Surely it is possible for an agent to have a
rational credence in a proposition to which it is not possible to attach an objective chance.
In fact, it is not as demanding as you might expect. To those propositions to which it seems
unnatural to assign an objective chance, the chance function assigns its truth value — 0 if
the proposition is false, or 1 if the proposition is true.
4After all, Ctch is simply a conjunction of propositions about the objective chances at t.
One of these is CA,tx , where ch(A) = x. And the others are all admissible.
5Proof.
P0(A|CtchE) =
P0(AE|Ctch)
P0(E|Ctch)
=
ch(AE)
ch(E)
= ch(A|E)
as required. 2
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Levi-Admissibility E is Levi-admissible for A at t iff, for all possi-
ble chance functions ch at t, if ch(E) > 0, then ch(A|E) = ch(A).
That is, on this account A is admissible for E at a time if every possible
chance function at that time renders A and E stochastically independent.
Three points are worthy of note:
(1) All propositions providing information about the chance of A at a
later time t′ > t, or information about the truth value of A, are Levi-
inadmissible for A at t, since A will be stochastically dependent on
such propositions according to some possible chance functions at t.
So this account of admissibility agrees with the examples of clearly
inadmissible propositions that we gave above.
(2) All propositions solely about time t or earlier times t′ < t are Levi-
admissible for A at t, since all such propositions will either be true
at t or false at t, and thus will be assigned chance 1 or 0 accordingly
by all possible chance functions at t.6 So this account of admissibility
agrees with the examples of clearly admissible propositions that we
gave above.
(3) If E is Levi-admissible for A at t, then P0(A|CA,tx E) = P0(A|CA|E,tx E) =
x. That is, HLWW’s Principal Principle follows from Levi’s version if
we understand the notion of admissibility as Levi-admissibility.
Taken together, (1), (2), and (3) entail that Levi-admissibility has all of the
features that Lewis wished admissibility to have.
Now, although Levi’s account of admissibility recovers Lewis’ exam-
ples, it might seem too demanding. Suppose, for instance, that A is a propo-
sition concerning the toss of a coin in Quito tomorrow — it says that it will
lands heads — while E is a proposition concerning tomorrow’s weather in
Addis Ababa — it says that it will rain. Then, intuitively, E is admissible
6For any probability function ch and any proposition A and E, if ch(E) = 0 or ch(E) = 1,
then A and E are stochastically independent. Note, however, that some philosophers deny
that past propositions have chance 0 or 1 — that is, they take some past propositions still
to be chancy (Hoefer, 2007; Frigg & Hoefer, 2010; List & Pivato, 2015). This is no problem
for Levi’s Principal Principle nor for Levi-admissibility. It just means there’s no guarantee
that past events are admissible. But someone who thinks that past events are still chancy is
unlikely to think that propositions that say which way those events turn out will always
be admissible. However, even amongst philosophers who take all past propositions to
have chance 0 or 1, there are some who take some past propositions to be inadmissible
evidence. Thus, for them, (2) is not a desiderata for an account of admissibility. For instance,
Nissan-Rozen (2017) claims that there are cases in which a proposition E that is true at t′
is inadmissible for A at a later time t > t′ because E provides an explanation of A, and
propositions that provide explanations contain information that overrides the information
provided by the chances. I side with Lewis against Nissan-Rozen on this, but it would take
me too far afield to address the issue here. For a valuable discussion, see (Joyce, 2007, 199).
Thanks to an anonymous referee for urging me to make these controversies clear.
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for A today. But E is not Levi-admissible for A today. After all, we are
considering an agent at the beginning of her epistemic life. And so there
are certainly possible chance functions — probability functions that, for all
she knows, give the objective chances today — that do not render E and A
stochastically independent.
However, in fact, on closer inspection, the Levi-admissibility verdict is
exactly right. Consider my credence in A conditional on E and the chance
hypothesis CA,t0.5 , which says that the coin in Quito is fair and so the uncon-
ditional chance of A today (t) is 0.5. Amongst the chance functions that
are epistemically possible for me, some make E irrelevant to A, some make
it positively relevant to A and some make it negatively relevant to A. In-
deed, we might suppose that the possible chances of A conditional on E
run the whole gamut of values from 0 to 1. In that case, surely we don’t
want to say that E is admissible for A and thereby impose, via the Princi-
pal Principle, the demand that our agent’s credence in A conditional on E
and CA,t0.5 is 0.5. After all, if I choose to place most of my initial credence
on the chance hypotheses on which E is positively relevant to A, then my
credence in A conditional on E and CA,t0.5 should not be 0.5 — it should be
something greater than 0.5. If I choose to place most of my initial credence
on the chance hypotheses on which E is negatively relevant to A, then my
credence in A conditional on E and CA,t0.5 should not be 0.5 — it should be
something less than 0.5. Of course, we might think that it is irrational for
our agent, a superbaby with no evidence one way or the other, to favour the
positive relevance hypotheses over those that posit neutral relevance and
negative relevance. We might think that she should spread her credences
equally over all of the possibilities, in which case their effects will cancel
out, and her credence in A conditional on E and CA,t0.5 will indeed be 0.5.
But of course to do this is to assume the Principle of Indifference and beg
the question.
Another possible objection: Levi’s Principal Principle is all well and
good in theory, but it is not applicable. Suppose we are interested in a
proposition A; and we have collected evidence E. How might we apply
Levi’s Principal Principle in order to set our credence in A? In the case of
Lewis’ version of the principle, we need only know the chance of A and
the fact that E is admissible for A, and we often know both of these. But,
in order to apply Levi’s version, we must know the chance of A conditional
on our evidence E. And, at least for large and varied bodies of evidence, we
never know this. Or so the objection goes.
But the objection fails. In fact, Levi’s Principal Principle may be ap-
plied in those cases. You don’t have to know the chance of A conditional
on E in order to set your credence in A when you have evidence E. You
simply have to have opinions about the different possible values that that
conditional chance might take. You then apply Levi’s Principal Principle,
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together with the Law of Total Probability, which jointly entail that your
credence in A given E should be your expectation of the chance of A given
E. Of course, neither Levi’s Principal Principle nor the Law of Total Proba-
bility will tell you how to set your credences in the different possible values
that the conditional chance of A given E might take. But that’s not a prob-
lem for the Moderate Subjective Bayesian, who doesn’t expect her evidence
to pin down a unique credal response. Only the Objective Bayesian would
expect that. You pick your probability distribution over those possible con-
ditional chance values and Levi’s Principal Principle does the rest via the
Law of Total Probability.
Here’s another feature of Levi-admissibility that may at first seem to tell
against it: it renders the admissibility relation symmetric. Thus, according
to Levi-admissibility, E is admissible for A at time t iff A is admissible for
E at t. And, equivalently, E is inadmissible for A at t iff A is inadmissible
for E at t. And yet the examples that we often give to motivate the notion
of admissibility might lead us to think that the notion is not symmetric: we
take past propositions to be admissible for future ones, but we don’t say ex-
plicitly that future propositions are admissible for past ones. Nonetheless,
Levi-admissibility entails that they are. However, once again, I think Levi-
admissibility delivers the correct answer. Suppose we have three times
t < t′ < t′′. Suppose the truth value of E will be settled by the earliest
time t, but the truth value of A will only be settled by the latest time t′′.
And suppose that we are considering our credences conditional on a sup-
position about the chances at the intermediate time t′. Then, intuitively, E
is guaranteed to be admissible for A at t′. And Levi-admissibility agrees.
Less intuitively, according to Levi-admissibility, A is guaranteed to be ad-
missible for E at t′. But in fact that is right. After all, at t′ the truth value
of E is fixed. So, according to whichever hypothesis about the chances at t′
we are considering, its chance at t′ is 0 or 1. So, under the supposition of
that hypothesis, our credence in E should be 0 or 1. So, learning A can do
nothing to change our credence in E. And thus, A is admissible for E at t′.
And Levi-admissibility agrees.
I conclude, then, that Levi-admissibility is at least a plausible candidate
account of admissibility. We come to it by adding some minimal assump-
tions about the admissibility of contemporaneous chance hypotheses, de-
riving a new version of the Principal Principle (namely, Levi’s), and then
looking to the account of admissibility that version of the principle sug-
gests. And we have seen that it saves the examples of intuitively admissi-
ble and inadmissible propositions that Lewis presented. What’s more, we
can rebuff three possible objections to it. We now show that Conditions 1
and 2 do not follow from it.
Recall Conditions 1 and 2 from above:
Condition 1 If your evidence at t gives no information about
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the connection between A and F, then F is admissible for A at t
(where F is an atomic proposition).
Condition 2 If your evidence at t gives no information about
the connection between A and F, then A ↔ F is admissible for
A at t (where F is an atomic proposition).
Do they follow from the account of admissibility as Levi-admissibility? It is
easy to see that they don’t. After all, if your evidence gives no information
about the connection between A and F, that means that it doesn’t rule out
possible objective chance functions on which F is positively relevant to A
nor functions on which F is negatively relevant to A. If it were to rule these
out, that would mean that it did contain information about the connection
between them. Thus, F is not Levi-admissible for A. And similarly for A↔
F. If your evidence gives no information about the connection between A
and F, it leaves open the possibility that A ↔ F is positively relevant to
A and possibility that it is negatively relevant, and the possible objective
chance functions that witness these possibilities also show that A ↔ F is
not Levi-admissible for A.
Thus, given the plausible account of admissibility as Levi-admissibility,
Conditions 1 and 2 are false and the HLWW argument fails.
5 Reading 2: Conditions 1 and 2 constrain Admissi-
bility
Of course, one philosopher’s modus ponens is another’s modus tollens.
That Conditions 1 and 2 are incompatible with the account of admissibil-
ity as Levi-admissibility might lead me to reject the former; but it might
lead you to reject the latter. Indeed, you might take Conditions 1 and 2
to be constraints on admissibility — any candidate account of admissibility
must vindicate them, since the intuitions that give rise to them are as strong
as those that tell us that propositions solely about the past must be admis-
sible evidence for any proposition about the future, whereas facts about
the future chances of a proposition are often inadmissible evidence for that
proposition. Or so you claim. Alternatively, you might hold that Condi-
tions 1 and 2 are not intended to be a consequence of the Principal Prin-
ciple, but rather plausible extra principles that, when combined with the
Principal Principle, entail the Principle of Indifference. Of course, in that
situation you couldn’t very well claim that the Principal Principle on its
own entails the Principle of Indifference, but you might offer the Principal
Principle + Condition 1 + Condition 2 as premises in a new argument for
the Principle of Indifference. In either case, you need to claim that there are
good independent reasons in favour of Conditions 1 and 2 — good enough
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reasons to prefer them to the account of admissibility as Levi-admissibility;
or good enough reasons to accept Conditions 1 and 2 as premises in an ar-
gument for the Principle of Indifference if you are not already convinced of
the latter. Are there such reasons? I think not.
I will raise an objection against our justification for Condition 2. First,
let us consider why we might take Condition 2 to be plausible; let us think
of where its intuitive appeal might lie. The idea seems to be this: When I
learn that two propositions, A and F, are equivalent — that is, when I learn
the biconditional A ↔ F — there are many ways I might respond. I might
retain my prior credence in A and bring my credence in F into line with
that. Or I might retain my prior credence in F and bring my credence in
A into line with that. Or I might do many other things. Condition 2 says
that, in one particular sort of situation, I should retain my prior credence
in A and bring my credence in F into line with that. The sort of situation
is this: I have very strong evidence supporting my credence in A because I
know its chance; I have no evidence concerning F; and I have no evidence
concerning the connection, if any, between A and F. In this situation, the
reasoning seems to go, I should stick with the credence for which I have
strongest evidential support, namely, A. Now, on the face of it, this seems
like a reasonable constraint on our response to evidence. It says, essentially,
that a credence formed in response to stronger evidence should be more
resilient than a credence formed in response to weaker evidence. And, as
a limiting case, a credence formed in response to strong evidence, such as
evidence about the chances, should be maximally resilient when compared
to a credence formed in response to no evidence.
The problem is that such reasoning leads to contradictions. Let’s see
how. Suppose that G, like F, is an atomic proposition. Then it is easy to
suppose that, just as our evidence provides no information about the con-
nection between A and F, it similarly provides no information about the
connection between A and FG, nor any information about the connection
between A and FG. For instance, suppose Astrid, Felix, and Garfield are
cats. Suppose A says that Astrid is black, F says that Felix is black, and G
says that Garfield is black. Then it might well be that your evidence pro-
vides no information about the connection between A and F, no informa-
tion about the connection between A and FG, and no information about the
connection between A and FG. If we follow the reasoning used to justify
Condition 2 above, we can therefore justify the following three constraints
on our credence function P:
(a) P(A|CA,tx (A↔ F)) = x
(b) P(A|CA,tx (A↔ FG)) = x
(c) P(A|CA,tx (A↔ FG)) = x
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Unfortunately, however, when 0 < x < 1, (a), (b), and (c) are inconsistent
constraints on a probability function.7 The problem is that, while Condition
2 restricts its application to biconditionals A ↔ F in which F is atomic, the
motivation just given for it justifies the more general principle that does not
impose this proviso. That is, it justifies what we might call Condition 2+:
Condition 2+ If your evidence at t gives no information about
the connection between A and F, then A ↔ F is admissible for
A at t (for any proposition F).
And the inconsistency of (a), (b), and (c) shows that Condition 2+ is incon-
sistent, since it entails all three of them. But if we offer a justification for a
principle, and our principle in fact establishes a more general but inconsis-
tent principle if it establishes anything at all, then our putative justification
fails — it does not justify the original principle. For instance, you cannot
justify an axiom of set theory by appealing to Frege’s Basic Law V, since
Basic Law V entails a series of axioms that are mutually inconsistent.
To resist this objection, HLWW must say why Condition 2 is true, while
Condition 2+ is false. They must tell us what is so special about atomic
propositions. They must say why rationality requires that P(A|CA,tx (A ↔
B)) = x when B is atomic, but not when B is not. Here is one attempt.
Suppose A, F, and G are atomic. Then A is true at half of all the possible
worlds; and A is true at half of the possible worlds at which A↔ F is true.
However, while A is true at half of all the possible worlds, it is only true
at one quarter of the worlds at which A ↔ FG is true, and it is only true
at one quarter of the worlds at which A ↔ FG is true. Thus, the response
goes, learning A↔ FG or learning A↔ FG gives me information about A
in a way that learning A ↔ F does not. The problem with this response is
that it ties the information given by one proposition B about another C to
the difference between the proportion of C-worlds amongst all worlds and
the proportion of C-worlds amongst B-worlds. But that is only reasonable
if you divide credences equally over all worlds. And demanding that is
simply assuming the Principle of Indifference. So the response begs the
question at issue.
7Let Q(−) = P(−|CA,tx ). Now, by the ratio definition of conditional probability and the
axioms of probability, if Q(A|A↔ X) = x, then Q(AX) = x[Q(AX) +Q(AX)]. Thus:
x[Q(AFG) +Q(A FG)] + x[Q(AFG) +Q(A FG)]
= Q(AFG) +Q(AFG) (by (b) and (c))
= Q(AF) (by the axioms of probability)
= x[Q(AF) +Q(A F)] (by (a))
And this gives:
Q(A F ∨ AG) +Q(A F ∨ AG) = Q(A F)
which implies Q(A F) = Q(AG) = Q(AG) = 0. Thus, Q(A) = 0, and Q(A) = 1. 2
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6 Conclusion
The HLWW argument purports to show that the Principal Principle entails
the Principle of Indifference. But it fails on both of the two readings de-
scribed above. On the first reading, the crucial premises in the argument,
Conditions 1 and 2, are justified by the correct account of admissibility. But
we saw that a very plausible candidate account of admissibility in fact ren-
ders them false. On the second reading, Conditions 1 and 2 constrain the
correct account of admissibility. However, as we saw, the natural justifica-
tion for Condition 2 in fact entails a stronger principle, Condition 2+, which
is inconsistent. This undermines the justification for Condition 2. The log-
ical space is therefore safe once again for Moderate Subjective Bayesians,
that is, those who accept Precise Credences, Probabilism, and the Principal
Principle, but who deny the Principle of Indifference.
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